Intuition & reason: re-assessing dual-process theories with representational sub-activation

Trafford, James and Tillas, Alexandros (2015) Intuition & reason: re-assessing dual-process theories with representational sub-activation. Teorema, 34 (3). pp. 197-219. ISSN 0210-1602

Creators:
Trafford, James and Tillas, Alexandros
Description/Abstract:

There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes, (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rule-based, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in favour of a unitary cognitive system. More specifically, we suggest that intuitions (T1-processes) are sub-activated representations, which are in turn influenced by the weightings of the connections between different representations. Furthermore, we explain biases by appealing to the role of attention in thinking processes. The suggested view explains reasoning and bias whilst dealing with extant problems facing dual-process accounts.

Item Type:
Article
Official URL:
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/5238...
Date:
2015
Uncontrolled Keywords or tags :
intuitions, reasoning, dual-process theories, cognitive biases, representational networks, attention, cognitive debiasing
Schools:
School of Communications
Depositing User:
Dr James Trafford
Date Deposited:
12 Feb 2015 14:55
Last Modified:
05 Mar 2022 04:31
Trafford, James:
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6762-2918
URI:
https://research.uca.ac.uk/id/eprint/2643

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