**Empire’s New Clothes:**

**After the ‘peaceful violence’ of neoliberal coloniality**

**Abstract**

This article considers neoliberalism through the “peaceful violence” of its social spaces that are stratified and ordered around raciality whilst abjuring the explicit presence of racialised power. Many dominant analyses of neoliberalism in social science have figured racial injustices as ideological fossils to be swept away by a fundamentally neutral political economy that has shaped all human activity according to market principles. As such, racial injustices are understood as material deviations from conditions of economic power on the one hand, and cultural deviations in hegemonic common-sense on the other. Against the grain of these approaches, I argue that racialized power is better understood as a productive technology fundamental to the structuring of our worlds, their neoliberal organisation just one iteration of ongoing coloniality. Contrary to popular analysis and this account of neoliberalism, contemporary racialized violence and nationalist discourse are, therefore, not only consistent with the power of neoliberal classes, but also result from weaknesses in their hegemonic power.

**Keywords:** Neoliberalism; Racism; Power; Norms; Normativity; Social structures

**1. Introduction**

Fanon, in his analysis of colonial injustices drew attention to an “atmosphere of violence, that violence which is just under the skin”.[[1]](#endnote-1) This pervasive atmosphere is arguably familiar to supposedly postracial modes of power at work in neoliberal societies. For, as Ciccariello-Maher points out, the “false universalism of liberal rights does more than simply halt progress and stunt subjectivities, but – as our own ‘postracial’ present confirms – becomes a real weapon not for combatting but actively reinforcing White supremacy”.[[2]](#endnote-2) Take, for example, the supposed postracialism of Obama’s presidency, in which Obama focused not on systemic underfunding of Black communities, racialized police violence, and mass incarceration, but a bewildering array of anti-Black stereotypes “from parenting skills and dietary choices to sexual mores and television-watching habits”.[[3]](#endnote-3) These not only consolidate norms of White supremacy that have become more explicit in contemporary American discourse, but, as Taylor notes they also “close off the political space within which African-Americans can express legitimate grievances”.[[4]](#endnote-4) Such forms of “peaceful violence”[[5]](#endnote-5) – of a socius organised and ordered around raciality whilst also supposedly abjuring the presence of racialised power – have arguably become synonymous with specifically neoliberal forms of coloniality.[[6]](#endnote-6)

However, as Tilley and Shilliam point out, many dominant analyses of neoliberalism have tended to figure racial injustices as ideological fossils to be swept away by a fundamentally neutral political economy.[[7]](#endnote-7) In cultural studies and political theory, we have seen a proliferation of research arguing that neoliberalism reaches far beyond economic policy to insinuate a governing rationality across social, economic, and political realms to shape all human activity according to market principles.[[8]](#endnote-8) As Will Davies suggests, this is to follow the supposed neoliberal deflation of social structure and hierarchy, embedding “particular forms of economic rationality […] as the governing principles of nearly all public policy”.[[9]](#endnote-9) Whilst this gives lie to orthodox accounts of neoliberalism as an apolitical macroeconomic program, symptomatically these principles are understood to be race-neutral and relatively universal, since “theories of the market, neoliberal or otherwise, are not themselves racialised (not least since they deal in inputs of labour rather than human beings)”.[[10]](#endnote-10) Consequently, the contemporary reassertion of national interests in Europe and the United States is typically analysed as a return of the political over the economic since, as Harvey puts it, nationalism is “profoundly antagonistic to the neoliberal agenda”.[[11]](#endnote-11) Explicit racism and nationalism are supposed to be radically anti-neoliberal, foregrounding a “conventional wisdom that the ‘white working class’ who are ‘left behind’ by neoliberalism should be the central political focus”,[[12]](#endnote-12) both for right-populism and its critique.

Against the grain of these approaches, I will argue that we should consider racial injustices to be fundamental to the organising structure of our worlds, with its neoliberal organisation just one iteration of ongoing coloniality.[[13]](#endnote-13) To do so, we need to move beyond the division between cultural norms and material power that underlies the distinction between race and economics.[[14]](#endnote-14) As such, I outline a materialist account of social norms that operates across the social and physical organisation of our worlds. In this light, starting from a critical analysis of Iris Young’s work, I will argue that neoliberal coloniality has always required an architectonic system of collective normativity and legitimacy, which underpins racialized stratification whilst diffracting analysis of any loci of power. Ultimately, the idea is that racialised power is a kind of productive technology that organises behaviours and practices not only by explicit power or domination, but also through shaping social practices and driving seemingly contingent actions by necessity. So, contrary to popular analysis and neoliberal social science, contemporary racialised violence and nationalist discourse are not only consistent with the power of neoliberal classes, but also result from their increasing weakness.

**2. Against reductive neoliberalism**

Arguably, failures to account for the peaceful violence of neoliberal coloniality result from responding to the neoliberal deflation of social structure and hierarchy with the reduction and flattening-out of social and normative power to market norms, or indeed the elimination of normative power altogether.[[15]](#endnote-15) In these theoretical articulations, typically, racial injustices are understood as material deviations from conditions of economic power on the one hand, and cultural deviations in hegemonic common-sense on the other. Reinforcing the long-held notion that class and economy are the root material drivers of socio-political organisation, race is considered an ideological prejudice or mediatised weapon that reinforces and obscures economic inequalities. The dynamics of racial power are thereby treated primarily as a naming device attached to *cultural* differences by advocates of both postracial neoliberalism and multicultural liberalism. As Fraser has long pointed out, conceiving of racial power as a naming device bifurcates into calls for recognition and redistribution.[[16]](#endnote-16) The misrecognition or nonrecognition of peoples is a “form of oppression”,[[17]](#endnote-17) not because it constrains subjects or “does them harm” but because it “impairs these persons in their positive understanding of self”.[[18]](#endnote-18) Where raciality is understood as a form of socioeconomic oppression, it is typically reduced to the underlying political-economic structure of society whether by structural Marxism, a Rawlsian account of ‘basic structure’, or the capillary power of neoliberal financialisation.[[19]](#endnote-19) So, racial injustices could therefore be dealt with only via individual or state recognition, or the redistribution of access to economic opportunity by a supposedly race-neutral economy or state.[[20]](#endnote-20) In both cases, race is understood as difference from a political or cultural norm, rather than a means of structuring social worlds. This threatens to naturalise material inequalities by emphasising cultural difference and individual racial prejudice against the backdrop of a neutral economy, and to accept the neoliberal discourse that a more interventionist economy could provide the necessary machinery for ‘racial uplift’.

Against the background of the neoliberal deflation of social structure and hierarchy, Iris Young’s approach to structural injustice promises to reconsider both normative abstraction and material structures, without reifying either. For Young:

Structural injustice exists when social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities.[[21]](#endnote-21)

Here, Young avoids a discourse of injustice that evaluates our social practices through the lens of misrecognition or unequal economic distribution, arguing instead that most structural injustices are “produced and reproduced by thousands or millions of persons usually acting within institutional rules and according to practices that most people regard as morally acceptable”.[[22]](#endnote-22) As such, human institutions, behaviours, and interactions can be understood as processes constituting a social structure in which agents are positioned.[[23]](#endnote-23)

Young’s approach is therefore positioned in the lineage of accounts that emphasise social *practices* over monolithic social structure.[[24]](#endnote-24) These range from Giddens’ and Bordieu’s sociological approaches,[[25]](#endnote-25) to Butler’s performative analysis of gender,[[26]](#endnote-26) bell hooks’ analysis of Black femininity,[[27]](#endnote-27) and Foucault’s analysis of power.[[28]](#endnote-28) These approaches seek to reconcile material and normative modes of analysis whilst also responding to issues facing structuralist approaches to normative governance. By emphasising repeated and iterated performances that become identifiable as normative over our practices, these approaches avoid problems facing legislative approaches to norms famously diagnosed by Wittgenstein.[[29]](#endnote-29) Moreover, this sort of view leads naturally to a view of power that coheres with a deflated social structure coherent with standard approaches to neoliberal governance.[[30]](#endnote-30) For example, power is understood by Young primarily through Frye’s metaphor of the ‘invisible cage’, which is “an enclosing structure of forces and barriers which tends to the immobilisation and reduction of a group or category of people”.[[31]](#endnote-31) Here, power is an intersubjective relation, which is operative as a background modulation and orientation of our practices in which a “field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up”.[[32]](#endnote-32) It is in this light that Young focuses on structural oppression:

Oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people’s choices or policies. Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules.[[33]](#endnote-33)

This emphasises the *constrictive* power of homeostatic regulatory mechanisms based in parameters of control that may be set centrally in advance, such as laws, or based in networks of control such as metricised surveillance through which recursive sanctions alter behaviour. This form of power, consisting in guiding the possibility of conduct, requires not the elimination of norms, but their reduction to iterated practices.[[34]](#endnote-34)

There are several problems with this *regularist* approach, however, not least of which is that it runs into gerrymandering problems where supposedly implicit norms could simply be ‘read-off’ from regularities in practice.[[35]](#endnote-35) The problem is that we could force a finite set of practices to conform to several distinct norms, and for any ‘deviant’ form of practice, it can be made to cohere with some norm or other. As such, any attempt to distinguish between correct and incorrect practices would seem to quickly break down, and the idea that we could ‘read-off’ norms from practice would seem to end-up with our ‘writing-away’ all those occasions in which we do not reason according to the norms that are supposedly implicit in our behavior.

The upshot is that any account of social structure in which norms are reducible to regularities leaves us with no way to make sense of what is the same among performances of a practice, or how it could be maintained across iterations of that practice.[[36]](#endnote-36) Effectively, norms are reduced so they have no real power to be either causally efficacious or transmissible across social structures. This is borne out by Young’s insistence that structures are less real, causal, entities, and more a *point of view* on society that we take when we consider how people converge to produce positional differences: “[s]ocial structures are not part of the society: instead they involve, or become visible in, a certain *way of looking* at the whole society”.[[37]](#endnote-37) As such, Young’s analysis of social structures would completely neglect the ways in which social and material structures influence and sculpt those practices and meanings from “determinate structural locations and the materiality of structural elements”.[[38]](#endnote-38)

**3. Racialised power as productive technology**

Building upon Young’s approach, whilst avoiding the above pitfalls, requires a materialist account of norms operating across sociomaterial strata to structure our world. With this, we can shift beyond the reduction of race to both material economies and individual practices, drawing attention to the imbrication of material power and the constitution of racial abstraction through socialised practices.

Robert Brandom’s work also attempts to construe norms in the context of social interaction. As he puts it, “we can envisage a situation in which *every* social practice of community has as its generating response a performance which must be in accord with another social practice”.[[39]](#endnote-39) Moreover, Brandom attempts to deal with regularist gerrymandering by arguing that social norms can be identified by the way we *sanction* each other in ordinary linguistic practice.[[40]](#endnote-40) By taking an evaluative attitude towards each other’s utterances, and judging them to be correct or incorrect, we go on to sanction these utterances accordingly. As Brandom notes, sanctioning cannot itself be a matter of regularity, since that would simply reintroduce the problem of regularist gerrymandering at the level of sanctions. As such, sanctions must themselves be normative, so we have “norms all the way down” (Brandom, 1994, p. 44). That is, Brandom effectively *postulates* the existence of proprieties of practice as normatively primitive, which determine our abilities to evaluate and sanction, each other.[[41]](#endnote-41)

Whilst this move ensures that norms are not reducible to regularities, they are also wrested away from materiality and structure, introducing a circularity of norms in which we would need to attribute to our attitudes a kind of appropriateness or inappropriateness in the first place. As a result, the autonomy of the social becomes a normative space in which we are inscribed which may only impinge upon our bodies, and our bodies upon it, in an *external* relation. Moreover, in this setting, what becomes normative is just the name for the most authoritative means by which our dispositions, thoughts, and attitudes are oriented.[[42]](#endnote-42) This is to say, the social relationships upon which Brandom’s project rests requires the existence of transparency and equality that abjures power. We are all supposed to be on an equal footing for Brandom, so the embedding of norms in sociohistorical and material structures is obscured, and the social context ends up playing a conservative role in Brandom’s approach.[[43]](#endnote-43)

Nonetheless, where we are left with Brandom’s view is a normative landscape in which, through conservative practices of sanctioning, certain ways of talking and acting become much easier than others, and in which it becomes much more difficult to see things otherwise so that certain actions take on a more “reasonable” weight than others. As such, the intersubjective constitution and reconstitution of such normative spaces can, profitably, be understood through *mechanisms of attunement* with each other.[[44]](#endnote-44) The general idea is that interactions give rise to norms when the relevant interactional activities reinforce certain patterns of behaviour as acceptable or unacceptable in social practices, through recursively acting upon those underlying patterns. In other words, norms are just the regularities produced by adjustment and correcting mechanisms of feedback internal to interactions, and externally to material resources and institutional formations, where these lead to the reinforcing of stabilities in those interactions, and their recognition as being appropriate or inappropriate.[[45]](#endnote-45) This can be understood in terms of recursive feedback loops that are generated through the interactions between patterns of behaviour, and so are apiece with the mechanisms that generate those patterns through differential response. Our normative vocabulary serves to further modify and reinforce our attitudes and activities in the context of those interactions, so making possible their coordinated activity. Norms, therefore, become sedimented through our interactions, since the cases in which explicit normative talk is required to keep our interactions coherent with each other are decreased over time by the convergence of our practices.[[46]](#endnote-46) As Kiesselbach puts it, this gives us a way of understanding “normative talk as essentially calibrational”.[[47]](#endnote-47)

If we think of the constitution of norms in terms of these mechanisms of attunement, then we can begin to see how power is operational in their composition from the ground up. Norms are reinforced through feedback mechanisms often involving “soft” sanctioning practices such as encouragement in a certain direction, embodied and linguistic cues, and recursive feedback that puts pressure on us to act and speak in certain ways.[[48]](#endnote-48) Moreover, in understanding the interactional nature of dialogue and the institution of norms as consisting of primarily *sub-intentional* processes, we are able to understand the role that our embodied actions, feelings, and habits play in the coordination and socialisation of our dispositions.[[49]](#endnote-49) As such, is better to think of norms not as rules, but as constituting “a way of orienting bodies in particular ways”,[[50]](#endnote-50) or a direction of flow that acquires a momentum as a pattern that is reinforced, so becoming directive.

**INSERT FIGURE 1.**

So, the normativity of practices is not expressed through regularities, nor by any rule-like norm to which they are always already supposed to conform. Rather, norms *arise from* more fundamental coordination and attunements with others, our environments, and resources. So, for example, the harmonious nature of much linguistic interaction may be understood to be an effect of the sedimentation of norms through the sanctioning of linguistic practice, and, therefore, of the embedding of specific forms of power. This is not to say that distinct modes of power do not cohere with each, so, for example, sanctioning is very often manifested as a set of discursive rules with violent support, in codes of the penal system, incarceration, and collateral violence, for example. These work hand-in-hand with other mechanisms of attunement, subtle practices pushing populations towards illegal markets, for example, where wage labour and housing are rendered differentially (in)accessible through informal prejudices and redlining practices. As norms become stable over time in this way, they are entrenched, structuring and generating new practices and norms that further establish them across multiple systems. As such, each interaction is a node at which local relations and practices are interwoven with broader systems and structures. In other words, normative structures are *generatively entrenched* norms,[[51]](#endnote-51) where this entrenchment is both constrictive and creative.[[52]](#endnote-52) What makes a *shared* practice is not similarity of behaviour or shared content, rather it is a complex system of interaction and attunement leading to the entrenchment of normative structure.

So, norms do not only constrain us, nor do they only legitimate injustices through positing groups of people as inferior, or through symbolic violence.[[53]](#endnote-53) Rather, norms expressed through our language, meaning, and actions, may be inherently unjust because they shape our actions as carriers of attunement. In this way, injustices become entrenched, structuring our capacities, activities, and experiences of the world. As such, race is not just “a concept which signifies and symbolises social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies” or a “complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle”.[[54]](#endnote-54) Rather, we can begin to consider racialised power as structuring the fabric of our worlds through sculpting our capacities and abilities, and organising possibilities such that they are limiting for certain activities for certain people and enabling for others. In this sense, “race has the same kind of materiality as class does in constituting the hierarchies and eviscerations of the ‘social’”.[[55]](#endnote-55) So, we avoid the bifurcation that would reduce racial injustices to material power or normative abstraction, and consider the imbrication of both insofar as abstractions are both constituted through, and affecting, material domination. Norms are emergent properties that are abstract in the sense that they are non-reducible to individual behaviour, but also immanent to our practices and their material embedding in socioeconomic and technical systems. As such, the micro-level of mechanisms of attunement at work in our individual interactions may be understood through their structural composition, and the ways in which a heterogenous racialised structure emerges through them.[[56]](#endnote-56)

The effects of these attunement mechanisms in constituting norms is to shape the landscape in which we are all situated, engulfing and (re-)producing complex social spaces, and entrenching horizons of thought.[[57]](#endnote-57) As such, these effects consist, in part, of organisational stratifications and attunements across practices and understanding, so that the social realm is internally differentiated and organised into relatively stable hierarchical spaces with distinct normative forms.[[58]](#endnote-58) Moreover, this normative structure, whilst resulting from entrenched contingent practices, takes on the appearance of stability, longevity, and even necessity. The generative entrenchment of norms constitutes normative structure that shapes the activities, practices, and organisations that are built upon them. As such, our actions occur within a space of possibility that is generated by normative structure, and modulated through mechanisms of attunement in layered systems of dependency. Through positive feedback based in this structure, these seemingly arbitrary actions become profoundly necessary whenever they act as generative structural elements for other contingencies added later.[[59]](#endnote-59) The more dependents that normative structure has, where other things like institutions, laws, and technologies adapt to that structure, the more it becomes entrenched.[[60]](#endnote-60) So, what is produced in these sorts of practices is a hierarchy of preserved contingencies,[[61]](#endnote-61) which become increasingly occluded as contingencies.[[62]](#endnote-62) Thus, our active engagement in social institutions and practices such as housing and welfare policy, containment and enclosure through prisons, ghettoisation, and curfews, militarised policing, zero tolerance and technologies of ‘population-centric’ warfare, the distribution of the border to points of service access, and racial configurations as threats to ‘white’ neighbourhoods and jobs, maintain a social order that is required to stabilise contemporary racialised power. Ultimately, the idea is that racial power is a kind of productive technology that organises behaviours and practices not only by explicit domination, but also by shaping social practices and driving seemingly free actions by necessity.

**4. Neoliberal Coloniality**

Drawing attention to the normative structure of racialised injustices shifts us away from their reduction to socioeconomic practices such that they could be ameliorated by redistribution. For example, approaching racial injustices through an economically reductive analysis, Fraser considers the marginalisation of surplus populations, those “confined to undesirable or poorly paid work or being denied access to income-generating labor altogether”,[[63]](#endnote-63) as does Young who considers “people the system of labor cannot or will not use”.[[64]](#endnote-64) The language of marginalisation here reinforces the idea that a benevolent liberal state could restructure its distribution of resources to include those differentiated in this way.[[65]](#endnote-65) But, this fails to account for the conditioning grounds of injustices, succumbing to the temptation to think that we could solve racial injustices through granting agency, or subjectivity, to a racialised ‘other’ through practices of integration or inclusion. This is to offer minority groups a “space within liberalism”,[[66]](#endnote-66) without accounting for the ways in which both liberalism and neoliberalism are constitutively bound up with racialised power.[[67]](#endnote-67)

Indeed, whilst taking race to be a naming device attached to given cultural differences engenders analysis of differential inclusion and disproportionate access to socio-political power, this could not explain how raced groups could be profitable as “aberrant economic subjects in the very articulation of post racial claims of achieved equality”.[[68]](#endnote-68) For example, the situation of crises of economic anxiety since 2008 in neoliberal discourses of anti-immigration and ‘scroungers’ serves to concretise the former as a problem of racialised others, even whilst those supposed to fall under those categories were disproportionately both targeted by predatory banking and affected by subsequent austerity policies.[[69]](#endnote-69) Here, the reduction of raciality to cultural difference against a backdrop of race-neutral markets thus supports an analysis of raced bodies as problematic and deficient economic subjects, undergirded by normative structures of raciality that produce beings supposedly “without self-determination”,[[70]](#endnote-70) and “marked by mental traits that render them unable to inhabit the economic, legal, and moral positions unique to the modern subject”.[[71]](#endnote-71) Thus, the problem of racial subjection, such that neoliberal debt and poverty are asymmetrically felt by racialised groups, is presented as a failure of those subjected to wrest themselves from particularity.[[72]](#endnote-72) This structures a peaceful violence against a “people arrested in their evolution, impervious to reason, incapable of directing their own affairs”,[[73]](#endnote-73) coupled with ongoing material and physical violence of internal borders and immigrant deportation targets.

On this view, neoliberal coloniality can be understood as systemically structuring the social world through a landscape of power that emerges through, and beyond, colonialism. This includes the enduring intersubjective constructions of race that were produced through supposedly objective European knowledge, and that constitute not only a subordinating relation between coloniser and the dominated, but also the “colonisation of the imagination”.[[74]](#endnote-74) Thus, coloniality “defines culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations”.[[75]](#endnote-75) Moreover, peaceful violence is a substantive feature of colonisation that is *internal* to states like the U.S. and UK.[[76]](#endnote-76) As such, we can capture the ways in which active and ongoing colonial power is, far from inimical to neoliberalism, inextricable from it. That is to say, neoliberalism both thrives on, and is constituted by the “racialised division of labour, wealth accumulation, property ownership, environmental degradation and global debt”,[[77]](#endnote-77) together with its abjuration. So, in continuity with histories of Black violence, this gives ground to understanding neoliberal coloniality as “perpetual war”,[[78]](#endnote-78) at the level, not only of bodies configured as “killable”,[[79]](#endnote-79) but also of broader forms of power that shape the public sphere and are in turn shaped by it.[[80]](#endnote-80) And, significantly, the latter is both assisted and obfuscated by accounts defining neoliberalism as market rationality writ-large.

That is, the normative structure of neoliberal coloniality is traceable through the coercion of entire populations racialised as failing to conform to the “management of populations with the aim of cultivating […] individualistic, competitive, acquisitive and entrepreneurial behaviour”.[[81]](#endnote-81) This rests upon the naturalisation of entrenched racialised power such that this sort of intervention is deliberate and robust in its management of behaviour to encourage commercialisation and competition amongst certain groups of people and corporations, whilst rolling back the traditionally socially democratic role of the state in welfare provision, medical aid, and labour standards.[[82]](#endnote-82) Take, for example, the assimilation of non-White peoples as “honorary humans”,[[83]](#endnote-83) symbolised in the figure of Obama as Black, yet postracial, president. This, coupled with a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy in which honorary humans are co-opted to distribute racialised power through communities, further cemented the expansion of the prison-industrial system, racialised poverty, and joblessness that exemplifies the forcible proscription of the majority of racialised people from power.[[84]](#endnote-84) The systemic *production* of Black American poverty, incarceration, and joblessness is, under these conditions, taken as proof of undeservingness, so recursively entrenching norms of *both* individual responsibility and anti-Black stereotypes.[[85]](#endnote-85)

This is antithetical to critical analyses of neoliberalism which argue that the capacities of competitive economics have become embedded into our ordinary beliefs and practices, so “[producing] subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and a new organisation of the social”.[[86]](#endnote-86) In other words, neoliberalism is a “dominant political rationality that moves to and from the management of the state to the inner workings of the subject, normatively constructing and interpellating individuals as entrepreneurial actors”,[[87]](#endnote-87) in the image of “homo economicus”.[[88]](#endnote-88) Moreover, it is typically thought that “marketisation entails a categoric delegitimisation of distinctions”,[[89]](#endnote-89) and that neoliberalism “was not inherently ethnonationalist, authoritarian, or plutocratic”.[[90]](#endnote-90)

In stark contrast, the analysis of material norms allows us to account for the for the *constructive* power of normative structures whose entrenched raciality is *productive* of the subject proper of neoliberal economics and politics, required even for homo economicus to function. Even explaining the coherence of discourses of self-management and individual responsibility, together with the productive racialisation and violence characteristic of neoliberal coloniality, requires an account of the underlying normative structures of raciality that produces subjects supposed to lie outside of the economies of neoliberalism whilst being constitutively required for it to function, as “raciality functions among the conditions of possibility for articulating the proper subject of the Political”.[[91]](#endnote-91)

The supposed razing to the ground of differential societal organisation through a reduction to economic labour is situated in the context of histories of empire and commonwealth, and the ongoing accrual of wealth through violent colonisation, whether explicated in terms of protectionism against fanatical incursion, or protectionism of international policy competition and the “expansive logic of capital”.[[92]](#endnote-92) Moreover, whilst racialised power is modulated through “global security architectures”,[[93]](#endnote-93) across relatively illiberal forms of neoliberalism (Reagan, Thatcher), to its liberal façade (Clinton, Blair), it is fundamentally built upon governance and reproduction of disproportionate access to labour markets, mobility, and access to resources. Against a mythic level playing-field, neoliberalism has shaped landscapes of power against any political actor that would attempt to rectify extant material and normative inequality. Far from inimical to racial stratification, coloniality has simply been recalibrated for a specific set of neoliberal values against which differences may be measured, and inclusivity meted out.[[94]](#endnote-94)

**5. The weakness of strength**

We are left with two major theses. The first is that the seeming strength of recent racialised violence and nationalist discourse should not be understood as antithetical to neoliberalism, since racialised power and stratification structures neoliberal worlds. The second emerges from a hypothesis suggested by our analysis: whenever there are mechanisms of attunement holding together structures of complex and dynamic power, if these become weakened, then at those points of weakness, sanctions, punitive measures, dissonance, and violence will all become strengthened in favour of maintaining extant power. We would expect to see highly weaponised discursive manoeuvres in attempt to reattune our material practices through sanctions directed towards supporting status quo power. Take, for example, Steve Bannon’s proclamation: “You argue for sovereignty and they call you a nativist. You argue for your freedom and they call you a xenophobe. You argue for your country and they call you a racist. But the days of that smear are over. Let them call you xenophobes, let them call you nativists. Wear it like a badge of honor”.[[95]](#endnote-95) We would also expect to see explicitly endorsed violence, such as the U.S. ‘Muslim ban’, Yarl’s wood, violent anti-immigration policing, and the fire at Grenfell tower. What this tells us is that the ability of neoliberal coloniality to maintain power is weak, so its normative forms of power have become explicit, with sanctions enforced in attempt to maintain the strategic assertion of a weakened hierarchy and structured forms of injustice. By emphasising the work of social interests and stratifications underlying the Trump and Brexit votes, we can see how both project virulent racism onto the figure of the white working class as a constructive device that shifts normative support for racialised expression more generally. So, whilst endemic to neoliberal coloniality, where racialised fears, distancing, and contempt were left implicit, normative structures increasingly support explicit forms of racialised discourses around white resentment and supposed oppression. In this sense, Brexit, Trump, and rise of Alt-Right, should be understood not as signifying the strength of a political movement so much as the weakness of the power of centrist political classes, and of white middle income power more generally.

Yet, according to widespread analysis of these events, we are witnessing a backlash of a “left behind” white working class against liberal political classes.[[96]](#endnote-96) Understood as indicative of wider social attitudes to cosmopolitan cities and a patriotic nostalgia for an industrial past, this has focused politics around economic causes and anxieties both endemic to decades of neoliberal policy, and exacerbated by austerity measures since the 2008 crash. Left movements both external and internal to state governance have rushed towards unity of the ‘many’ or the ‘99%’ against financial elites, to the detriment of racial injustices: from the denunciation of Black activism within the Occupy movement;[[97]](#endnote-97) through the struggle to consider racial inequality outside of class reduction in the Sanders campaign;[[98]](#endnote-98) and catering to xenophobic tendencies and anti-Black policy around immigration and policing in the Corbyn movement.[[99]](#endnote-99)

But, according to the above, the increasing *explicitation* of racial violence should neither be seen to indicate a decisive break from race-neutral neoliberalism, nor the exclamations of disaffected and increasingly precarious ‘white working class’. Rather, this supposedly inimical relationship that would efface the racialised normative structure of our worlds, in fact buttresses its entrenchment and neuters the capacity of any movement to shift beyond neoliberalism by focusing on a white ‘left behind’ or “invisible working class”.[[100]](#endnote-100) At best, this leaves us with superficially stratified groups’ interests pitted against each other with relative discoherence, ultimately strengthening neoliberal coloniality through the management of purportedly affirmed groups whilst leaving the productive conditions of those stratifications intact. Indeed, the effects of racialised discourse may well be understood as the cementation of a reduction of racialisation to the affirmation of cultural differences through sanctions that further ground the abjuration of shifts in underlying racialised power. In this sense, somewhat paradoxically, explicit racism is just postracial power made clear.

The division between the socioeconomic realm of politics proper and the normative realm of cultural difference has enabled the relegation of racial injustices to individual prejudice whilst concentrating on economic imbalances as means to rectify their root cause. In this light, Black identity politics are often understood to be fundamentally reactionary and incapable of overcoming the market-rationality that supposedly lies at the ground of all subjectivity.[[101]](#endnote-101) It is supposed that politics can either be identitarian or class-based, with a politics of identity inevitably oriented towards recognition and access to resources for misrepresented groups *inside* neoliberal capitalism.This division is wrong. Not only does this give ground to weaponised technologies of racial coercion that are constitutive of neoliberal power, it also fails to account for the ways in which political subjects are produced and reproduced through the structural injustices organising our worlds. Ultimately, where we end up is with a resistance to neoliberalism that sediments and supports the production of neoliberal subjects through racialised violence: more prisons, more police, more jingoism.

**6. Conclusion**

The above has obvious ramifications for the contemporary emergence of socialist movements in the US and the UK, which thus face significant hurdles caused by their acceptance of the reduction of injustices to material and economic conditions whilst increasingly failing to consider racial stratification. For example, whilst it would be peremptorily naïve to think that shifts towards cooperative models of ownership and universal basic income or services would not engender improved economic conditions for subjugated populations, the relegation of structured racial injustices to emergent effects of economics could easily ingrain ghettoisation and criminalisation of racialised people through the consolidation and distribution of boundaries and borders rather than their evisceration. The entrenched normative structure of neoliberal coloniality is built upon a hard-core that is relatively resistant to revision, not because it is necessary, but because of the functional costs required for change:

Rebuilding foundations after we have already erected an edifice on them is demanding and dangerous work. It is demanding: unless we do it just right, we’ll bring the house down, and not be able to restore it on the new foundations. It is dangerous, and there are rarely guarantees that we are doing it right. We’d rather just ‘make the best of it’, doing what we can to patch problems at less fundamental levels [[102]](#endnote-102).

Of course, shifting structural power is difficult, to say the least, since entrenchment locks-in the normative structure that gives it foundation. But, the inability to deal with foundational normative injustices, catering to discourses of illegal immigration, increased policing, and the unstable signifier of the nation, for example, threatens to deliver only short-term kluges that ultimately entrench rather than destabilise racial injustices.

In this vein, and given the ways I have articulated normative structure, the central task for any movement against neoliberalism *tout court* would seem to be, not a return to equilibria through the inclusion and expansion of liberal democratic institutions, but to rectify the injustices of neoliberal coloniality by moving towards their abolition and restitution through the constitution of horizons of thought and action beyond liberal political theory’s presumptions towards supposedly non-partisan pragmatism and compromise.[[103]](#endnote-103) Rather than invoke universal ‘logics’ of neoliberalism, instead we would need to foreground the normative practices of those largely excised from neoliberal discourse, misattuned and misaligned as “surplus humanity”,[[104]](#endnote-104) building the conditions for their material support. That is to say, any emancipatory politics requires us to bring to the forefront existing survival strategies and sociopolitical formations, refusing the legitimacy of state and market power, and unsettling normative structures by rendering explicit the peaceful violence underpinning contemporary forms of White supremacy.[[105]](#endnote-105) To do so requires us to reconstruct a normative force, or a direction of travel, that fundamentally operates against the grain of coloniality, forging resistance to the very structures of our realities so ingrained are they into everyday systems, habits, practices, and experiences.[[106]](#endnote-106) This is a process of *constructive abolition*, aiming to destabilise the very structures of the world, destroy the systems through which White supremacy is constituted, and scaffold practices to build platforms that entrench worlds beyond and outside of coloniality.

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1. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth.*, 70. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Ciccariello-Maher, *Decolonizing Dialectics*, 65. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Taylor, *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation*, 142–43. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Taylor, 143. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Trask, ‘The Color of Violence’, 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. See Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*; Goldberg, *The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism*; Spence, ‘The Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics’. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Tilley and Shilliam, ‘Raced Markets: An Introduction’. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Symbolic of these is Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution*. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Davies, *The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition*, 13. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Davison and Shire, ‘Race, Migration and Neoliberalism’. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 79. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Tilley and Shilliam, ‘Raced Markets: An Introduction’, 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. For a conception of worlds conducive to this one, see Lugones, ‘Playfulness,“World”‐travelling, and Loving Perception’. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. The arguments in the following are targeted specifically at this analysis of neoliberalism prevalent across the social sciences, and rooted in Foucault’s analysis. I do not intend to argue against all accounts of neoliberalism here particularly those primarily interested in its historical emergence and entrenchment, nor am I making the claim that neoliberalism was, or is, intentionally structured around race. It is worth noting that I do think that this is a defensible position, which I intend to argue for in further work. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Davies, ‘Elite Power under Advanced Neoliberalism’; Lash, ‘Power after Hegemony’; Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*; Massumi, *Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception*. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Fraser, ‘Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics’; Fraser, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ Condition*; Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*; Rawls, *Political Liberalism*; Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’; Taylor, *Multiculturalism*; Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Taylor, *Multiculturalism*. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, 249. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. On the latter, see the account in Davies, ‘Elite Power under Advanced Neoliberalism’. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution Or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model’, 114. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Young and Nussbaum, *Responsibility for Justice*, 95. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Young and Nussbaum, 55. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. For an excellent overview, see Rouse, ‘Practice Theory’. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis*; Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. bell, *Aint I a Woman? Black Women and Feminism*. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. As Turner suggests, the turn towards practices in social theory encompasses a “large family of terms […] such as tradition, tacit knowledge, *Weltanschauung*, paradigm, ideology, framework, and presupposition” Turner, *The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions*, 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*; Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations, 4th Edition (Trans. Hacker and Schulte)*. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Frye, *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory*, 11. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, 789. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, 41. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Indeed, Foucault’s central notion of a discursive formation relies upon there being a set of rules that both constitute and restrict a group’s discursive practices. Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 54. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Turner, *The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions*. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Young, ‘Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference’, 70. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Boucher, *The Charmed Circle of Ideology: A Critique of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler and Zizek*, 99. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*, 189–90. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Sanctions are also central to Elder-Vass’ account Elder-Vass, *The Reality of Social Construction*, 254., though as discussed above, they require a joint commitment to a norm *in advance* of the expectation of sanctioning. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. See also the criticisms of Brandom and elucidation of the following in relation to norms of reason in Trafford, ‘Reconstructing Intersubjective Norms’. (see also Kiesselbach, ‘Constructing Commitment: Brandom’s Pragmatist Take on Rule-Following’.). [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. See also O’neill, *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy*. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. As Habermas points out, the assessment of our attitudes is made, not by “an addressee who is expected to give the speaker an answer” Habermas, ‘From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom’s Pragmatic Philosophy of Language’, 345., but by a community that plays an authoritative role in considering what our utterances mean, and also which actions are taken to be correct or incorrect Habermas, 336. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. As Elder-Vass puts it, an account of “some sort of collective pressure is required if we are to provide an explanation of the similarity between the social practices of different people” Elder-Vass, *The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency*, 119. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Hill and Rubin, ‘The Genealogy of Normativity’. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. This is consistent with linguistic research showing how:

[…] speakers can start an utterance without a fully formed intention / plan as to how it will develop relying on feedback from the hearer to shape their utterance and its construal and this provides the basis for the joint derivation of structures, meaning and action in dialogue. Gregoromichelaki and Kempson, ‘Grammars as Processes for Interactive Language Use: Incrementality and the Emergence of Joint Intentionality’, 192. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Kiesselbach, ‘Constructing Commitment: Brandom’s Pragmatist Take on Rule-Following’, 123. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Ahmed, *Living a Feminist Life*, 49. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Gregoromichelaki and Kempson, ‘Grammars as Processes for Interactive Language Use: Incrementality and the Emergence of Joint Intentionality’. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Ahmed, *Living a Feminist Life*, 43. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Wimsatt, *Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality*. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Wimsatt and Griesemer, ‘Reproducing Entrenchments to Scaffold Culture: The Central Role of Development in Cultural Evolution’, 288. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Symbolic violence, for Bourdieu: “gentle, hidden exploitation is the form taken by man’s exploitation of man, whenever overt brutal exploitation is impossible” Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 192. Similarly, this differs from Butler’s concept of normative violence as discussed in Chambers and Carver, *Judith Butler and Political Theory: Troubling Politics*. See also Guha, ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency’. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 55. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Tilley and Shilliam, ‘Raced Markets: An Introduction’, 5. See also Chakravartty and Da Silva, ‘Accumulation, Dispossession, and Debt: The Racial Logic of Global Capitalism—an Introduction’. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Contrary to some discourses of complex networks, as emphasised in network science and social complexity theory David Byrne and Gillian Callaghan, *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: The State of the Art* (Routledge, 2013); David S. Byrne, *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An Introduction* (Psychology Press, 1998).Barabási, *Network Science*., complex organisation typically leads to a stratified domain of intricately nested hierarchies and locally stable systems. See also Lane, ‘Hierarchy, Complexity, Society’. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. On engulfment, see Da Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race*. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. This shifts us away from a standard understanding of difference as ameliorating the practice of externalization of norms and identity positions to prop up a specific set of practices as if they are universal Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*; Brown, ‘Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’; Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*; Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*; Hall, ‘New Ethnicities’; Mouffe, ‘Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?’; Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key v. 1*; Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Wimsatt, *Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality*, 135. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Wimsatt and Griesemer, ‘Reproducing Entrenchments to Scaffold Culture: The Central Role of Development in Cultural Evolution’, 293. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Wimsatt and Griesemer, ‘Reproducing Entrenchments to Scaffold Culture: The Central Role of Development in Cultural Evolution’. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. See also the analysis of contingent forms of liberal government and the specific historical figurations and modes of possibility enacted by them in Turner, ‘Internal Colonisation: The Intimate Circulations of Empire, Race and Liberal Government’. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. Fraser, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ Condition*, 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, 53. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution Or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*; Rawls, *Political Liberalism*; Young, ‘Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference’. For both, this requires the additional call for the recognition of difference as corrective to the supposed *impartiality* of Rawlsian approaches to basic structure. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism*, 26. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Goldberg, *The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism*. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Chakravartty and Da Silva, ‘Accumulation, Dispossession, and Debt: The Racial Logic of Global Capitalism—an Introduction’, 364. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Chakravartty and Da Silva, 364. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Chakravartty and Da Silva, 369. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Chakravartty and Da Silva, 382. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Da Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race*. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Fanon, ‘Why We Use Violence’, 654. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Quijano, ‘Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality’, 169. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. Maldonado-Torres, ‘On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept’, 243. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*; Pinderhughes, ‘Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism’; Turner, ‘Internal Colonisation: The Intimate Circulations of Empire, Race and Liberal Government’. I am led to consider the axis of U.S./U.K throughout as the target of analysis, though it does not escape me that in doing so I add to their centring in academic discourse. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Tilley and Shilliam, ‘Raced Markets: An Introduction’, 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Kelley, ‘Mike Brown’s Body: An Historical and Political Autopsy’. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. Turner, ‘Internal Colonisation: The Intimate Circulations of Empire, Race and Liberal Government’. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. Olson, *The Abolition of White Democracy*, 9–10. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. Gilbert, ‘What Kind Of Thing Is’ Neoliberalism’?’, 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. Gilbert, 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. Wynter, ‘Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, after Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument’, 329. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. Taylor, *From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation*. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. Parenti, *Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis*. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. Brown, ‘Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’, 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. Rottenberg, ‘The Rise of Neoliberal Feminism’, 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution*. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. Streeck, ‘Trump and the Trumpists’. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. Brown, ‘Apocalyptic Populism’. As Harmes argues, neoliberalism is fundamentally dependent upon nationalist policies, advocating fiscal and regulatory sovereignty within the context of international capital mobility. Harmes, ‘The Rise of Neoliberal Nationalism’. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. da Silva, ‘The Banalization of Racial Events’, 61. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space*. As Roy puts it, where “microfinance is a preferred weapon of mass salvation, so the Middle East is the site at which the war on terror and the war on poverty are conjoined” Roy, *Poverty Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development*, 114–15. See also Chakravartty and Da Silva, ‘Accumulation, Dispossession, and Debt: The Racial Logic of Global Capitalism—an Introduction’; Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. da Silva, ‘Notes for a Critique of the “Metaphysics of Race”’, 145. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism*. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. France-Presse, ‘Bannon Tells French Far-Right: “History Is on Our Side”’. [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
96. Mason, ‘To Beat the Tories, Labour Needs to Win in Areas Where Ukip Has Faded Away’. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
97. Ciccariello-Maher, ‘Counterinsurgency and the Occupy Movement’. [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
98. Reed, ‘Why Liberals Separate Race from Class’. [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
99. Wearing, David, ‘Labour Has Slipped Rightwards on Immigration. That Needs to Change’. [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
100. Mckenzie, ‘“It’s Not Ideal”: Reconsidering ‘Anger’and ‘Apathy’in the Brexit Vote among an Invisible Working Class’. [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
101. Reed, ‘Why Liberals Separate Race from Class’. [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
102. Wimsatt, *Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality*, 137. [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
103. For example, we might work towards the end of police violence, not through retraining and community policing, but through the abolition of the racialized structure of policing Vitale, *The End of Policing*. and imprisonment Davis, ‘Race and Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry’; Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?*. [↑](#endnote-ref-103)
104. Chen, ‘The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality: Notes toward an Abolitionist Antiracism’. [↑](#endnote-ref-104)
105. Samudzi Anderson, William Zoé, *As Black as Resistance: Finding the Conditions for Liberation* (Chico, CA: AK Press, 2018). [↑](#endnote-ref-105)
106. For an attempt to reconstruct Gramscian hegemony in broadly similar terms, see Williams, ‘Complexity & Hegemony: Technical Politics in an Age of Uncertainty’. [↑](#endnote-ref-106)