|Creators:||Trafford, James and Tillas, Alexandros|
There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes, (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rule-based, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in favour of a unitary cognitive system. More specifically, we suggest that intuitions (T1-processes) are sub-activated representations, which are in turn influenced by the weightings of the connections between different representations. Furthermore, we explain biases by appealing to the role of attention in thinking processes. The suggested view explains reasoning and bias whilst dealing with extant problems facing dual-process accounts.
|Uncontrolled Keywords or tags :||intuitions, reasoning, dual-process theories, cognitive biases, representational networks, attention, cognitive debiasing|
|Schools:||School of Communication Design|
|Date Deposited:||12 Feb 2015 14:55|
|Last Modified:||28 Feb 2017 15:14|
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